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INTRODUCTION
The principal aim of any country's mining legislation is to
encourage the orderly exploration and development of its mineral
resources so as to maximize economic benefit. To attain this objective,
the laws must create a regime which is conducive to the mining indus-
try, thereby attracting investment and innovation. This Article exam-
ines the legal framework for mining in Zambia, and examines the
extent to which Zambian mining achieves the goal of maximizing eco-
nomic benefit.
The sources of Zambian mining law are the common law of Eng-
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land' and the Mines and Minerals Act of 1976, Chapter 329 of the
Laws of Zambia.2 The Mines and Minerals Act repealed pre-colonial
legislation which had inhibited the fullest possible exploration and
development of the country's mineral resources. Prior to indepen-
dence, mineral rights were held as private property by a small number
of companies which had obtained them through concessions from
African chiefs during the 1800's. In some cases, these companies
retained possession of valuable mining property without developing it,
thereby preventing interested parties from developing the resources as
well. The Mines and Minerals Act was enacted to remedy this situa-
tion and to encourage the development of Zambia's mineral
resources.
3
This Article examines Zambia's mining laws by focusing on the
current requirements for obtaining the right to conduct mining opera-
tions in Zambia. Part I provides a general background of the mineral
industry as it has evolved throughout the history of Zambia. Part II
discusses the sources of law relating to mineral rights-English com-
mon law and Zambian legislation-and describes Zambia's approach
to mining rights. Part III describes the requirements for various types
of mining licenses, the nature of a mining interest, and the obligations
of a mining right holder. Finally, this Article concludes that, on the
whole, the Mines and Minerals Act of 1976 successfully promotes the
increased discovery and development of minerals in Zambia and
thereby maximizes economic benefit from Zambia's mineral resources.
I
BACKGROUND
A. HISTORY OF MINING IN ZAMBIA
1. Pre-colonial trade in copper
Minerals, especially copper, have long played an important role
in the economy of Zambia. The demand for copper for ornamental
use and as a medium of exchange dates back to the early iron age.4
Early quests for copper were limited by the primitive technology of the
1. Zambia, like most former British colonies, inherited a common law system when it
became independent. See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
2. Mines and Minerals Act, ch. 329 of the Laws of Zambia (as amended by No. 32 of
1976).
3. The preamble to the Mines and Minerals Act defines the purpose of the Act as
"[a]n Act to regulate the law relating to mines and minerals; to provide for the granting of,
renewal and termination of mining rights; to establish a Mining Affairs Appeals Tribunal
and define its jurisdiction; to create offenses and provide for the making of regulations; and
to provide for matters connected with or incidental to the foregoing." Id.
4. For a detailed discussion of the early discovery and uses of copper in Central
Africa, see J.A. BANCROFr, MINING IN NORTHERN RHODESIA 26-39 (1961) (Dr. Ban-
croft, a former Professor of geology at McGill University, discovered the Bancroft mine).
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times.5
The first Europeans to establish contact with what is now Zambia
were the Portuguese. Gold was the primary attraction to these early
overseas traders, but copper and ivory soon grew in demand. 6 In the
1700's, the Portuguese established a Jesuit mission trading post named
Zumbo at the confluence of the Luangwa and Zambezi Rivers. The
inhabitants of Zambia and Katanga quickly established a growing
trade in copper. Aided by the Portuguese, copper was sent to ports on
both the Atlantic and Indian Ocean coasts of Africa.7
During the height of trading at Zumbo, more than 300 tons of
copper were traded annually,8 an amazing amount considering the
technology of the time. Copper trade in Central Africa was temporar-
ily halted during the early 1800's, when local tribes destroyed the Por-
tuguese stronghold in Zambia. These early copper mines, however,
later facilitated the discovery of vast copper ore deposits by European
prospectors. 9
2. Current status of the Zambian copper industry
Today Zambia is the fifth leading producer of copper in the
world,10 possessing thirteen percent of the world's known copper
reserves. Most copper production in Zambia occurs in an area known
as the "Copperbelt."' Ten major mines are currently in production
in the area, 12 which is also the site of substantial prospecting and prep-
aration operations.
To a much lesser extent, Zambia produces other minerals.13
Cobalt, a by-product of copper production, is a growing export. Large
coal reserves are mined in the southern portions of Zambia. To date,
5. Id. at 26.
6. By the 1600's, the Portuguese had established themselves on both coasts of Africa,
on the west coast in Angola and on the east coast in Mozambique. The Portuguese located
in Mozambique first conducted trade with the inhabitants of Zambia. Upon arrival in this
area of central Africa, the Portuguese subdued Muslim Arabs who had been trading in gold
and ivory. See generally A. ROBERTS, A HISTORY OF ZAMBIA 105-07 (1976).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 107.
9. See J.A. BANCROFT, supra note 4, at 25. As Dr. Bancroft notes, later "European
arrivals directed their prospecting efforts almost exclusively to the 'discovery' and explora-
tion of these old workings." Id
10. The leading producers of copper are, in the order of annual production per thou-
sand tons: United States (1564 tons), U.S.S.R. (1224 tons), Chile (969 tons), Canada (868
tons), Zambia (757 tons). ZAMBIAN MINING YEARBOOK (1974).
11. The "Copperbelt," located in central Zambia, measures roughly 30 miles by 90
miles.
12. These mines are Chambishi, Chibuluma, Chingola, Kalengwa, Konkula, Luan-
shya, Mufblira, Rokana, Bwana, and Mkubwa.
13. The minerals, and yearly production in tons, are: coal, 1,094,425 tons; copper,
757,000 tons; amethyst, 34,356 tons; zinc, 27,041 tons; lead, 24,596 tons; silver, 8,938 tons;
and cobalt, 1,962 tons. ZAMBIAN MINING YEARBOOK (1978).
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coal has been used primarily for local consumption by the copper
mines. 14
Amethyst is another growing export of Zambia. In fact, Zambia
possesses the mine with the largest yield of semi-precious stones in the
world. Zambia produces fifty percent of the world's amethyst and cur-
rently holds the largest known deposits of that stone.15
Large nickel deposits have been discovered and are now being
explored under the Munali prospecting license.16 Iron ore is common
and widely distributed throughout Zambia. However, limited
amounts of work have been done to mine the great majority of mineral
deposits.17
The mining, processing, and exportation of copper form the cor-
nerstone of the Zambian economy. Depending on the current world
price of copper, mineral exports can account for up to sixty-eight per-
cent of the country's total revenues.18 Copper alone can be responsible
for ninety-five percent of Zambia's exports. 19 Few countries in the
world depend as much upon the production and price of one commod-
ity as does Zambia upon the production and price of copper.
The importance of mining in Zambia transcends economic value;
it has immense social and political significance. The industry employs
about fifteen percent of all people who receive cash wages in Zambia.20
City attractions and economic pressures have combined to result in a
mass exodus from the rural areas to the urban centers of the Cop-
perbelt. Most of Zambia's urban centers are situated on the Cop-
perbelt.21 Thirty-five percent of Zambia's inhabitants reside in these
14. Until the mid-1960's, all of Zambia's coal requirements were met by importing coal
from South Rhodesia. After the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by South Rhode-
sia and subsequent United Nations sanctions, Zambia began to develop coal mines within
its own borders. By 1972, domestic production of coal had grown to 936,500 tons and
imports had fallen to 10,000 tons. See THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, FOREIGN AREAS
STUDIES, ZAMBIA: A COUNTRY STUDY 195-96 (3d ed. 1979).
15. Mines Industrial Development Corporation, ZAMBIAN MINING INDUSTRY 3
(1974).
16. Mines Industrial Development Corporation, PROSPECTS FOR ZAMBIAN MINING
INDUSTRY 3 (1970).
17. The economic reports as to the viability of mining much of these deposits was still
unclear in the late 1970's. See ZAMBIA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 14, at 187.
18. In 1965, copper accounted for 60% of Zambia's revenues. On the average, for the
period from 1964 to 1975, mining accounted for 45% of Zambia's revenues. Id. at 188.
19. Id.
20. As of 1976, 64,580 of Zambia's 368,470 wage earners were employed in the mining
industry. ZAMBIA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 14, at 255 app. (based on information
from Zambia, Central Statistical Office, XIV MONTHLY DIGEST OF STATISTICS (Lusaka)
3-6 & Supp. at 1 (Mar.-June 1978)).
21. All of Zambia's major towns except three, Lusaka, Kahwe and Livingstone, are on
the Copperbelt. ZAMBIA: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra note 14, at 59.
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urban centers.22
Numerous social problems have accompanied the mass migra-
tion. The poverty existing in much of Zambia's rural area has been
magnified by a lack of available manpower.23 In most rural areas, the
sole source of cash is money sent home by laborers in the
Copperbelt.24
B. ZAMBIA PRIOR TO INDEPENDENCE
1. The British South African Company
No force has had a greater impact upon Zambia and its mining
industry than has the British South African Company (BSAC). Cecil
Rhodes founded the BSAC and secured a British charter for the com-
pany in 1889.25 The BSAC provided Britain and Rhodes with a means
to compete with other European powers for the vast mineral wealth of
the region.26
The BSAC quickly set out to compete with the other European
powers in establishing claims. Rhodes and the BSAC sent three expe-
ditions north from the South African Province. These expeditions
entered into treaties with local chieftains, granting British "protec-
tion" in exchange for pledges not to make similar agreements with
competing foreign powers.2 7 More importantly, these treaties secured
exclusive mineral rights to the region for the BSAC;2 8 the BSAC thus
acquired exclusive mineral rights over most of Zambia.
The BSAC administered the holdings it had secured in two
regions located within present-day Zambia: Northeast Rhodesia and
22. In 1963, urban dwellers constituted 20.5% of Zambia's population. By 1974,
35.4% resided in urban areas. Id. at 59. Of Zambia's population of 4,695,000 in 1974,
1,525,000 resided in Zambia's ten largest cities. Zambian Central Statistical Office, SAM-
PLE CENSUS OF POPULATION 1974: A PRELIMINARY REPORT (Lusaka) 6 (1975).
23. A. ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 191.
24. Id
25. This Royal Charter allowed the BSAC to use the authority of the British govern-
ment to stake out claims in Central Africa. This Charter covered an area vaguely defined
as north of Bechualand (now Botswana), northeast of the South African Republic and west
of the Portuguese claims (now Mozambique). The BSAC was to be responsible for
administering any acquired areas, but the British government was to retain the right
(although utilized infrequently) to supervise the company's actions. Such a Royal Charter
was a convenient method for the Royal Government to expand its empire. The East India
Company had been given similar powers in the 17th century. See generally A. ROBERTS,
supra note 6, at 155-72.
26. By this time, Belgium had claimed the Congo Free State (now Zaire); Portugal had
acquired Mozambique and the area which is now Angola. Additionally, Germany had laid
claim to large areas in the east called German East Africa (now Tanzania). See generally
A. ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 157-62.
27. Id. at 159.
28. Id. As Roberts notes, the grant of such exclusive mineral rights to the BSAC "was
largely a matter of insurance." The BSAC had little hope for finding minerals outside of
the Katanga region. Id. at 159.
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Northwest Rhodesia. These regions were administered separately
from 1900 until 1911. In 1911, the BSAC consolidated the regions
into Northern Rhodesia, the pre-independence name for Zambia. 29
The costs of administering Northern Rhodesia proved burden-
some to the BSAC. Since the BSAC had not yet developed the min-
eral resources of Northern Rhodesia, the region was used primarily as
a source of labor for mines elsewhere in Africa.30 On February 20,
1924, the BSAC turned the formal administration of Northern Rhode-
sia over to the British government, making Northern Rhodesia a Brit-
ish protectorate.31 Significantly, however, the British government
continued to recognize BSAC's exclusive claim to the mineral rights of
the country.
On August 1, 1953, Northern Rhodesia became part of the ill-
fated British Central African Federation. 32 The Federation, which
lasted until 1963, combined Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia,
and Nyasaland under a single administration. 33
2. Mining legislation and mining development in pre-independence
Zambia
The Mining Ordinance of 1912 was the first statute regulating
mining in Northern Rhodesia.34 The statute provided the BSAC with
a mechanism for regulating the mining rights granted by the com-
pany.35 For a minimal fee, anyone could acquire a prospecting license
which enabled the holder to search for minerals in any area of North-
ern Rhodesia, except those in which the BSAC had previously granted
29. Northern Rhodesia Proclamation, No. 1 of 1911.
30. Prior to 1923, the BSAC had done little to realize the mineral potentials of North-
ern Rhodesia. The BSAC did have a stake, either directly or indirectly, in the mines of the
Katanga region and in Southern Rhodesia. Thus, the BSAC benefited by supplying cheap
labor from Northern Rhodesia. See generally A. ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 177-78.
31. As a British Protectorate, Northern Rhodesia was under the administration of the
British Colonial Office.
32. Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Constitution) Order in Council, Stat. Instr.
1953, No. 1199. After a few years the Federation began to show strains. Constitutionally
and politically, Southern Rhodesia was the center of the Federation. Much of the joint
profits of the Federation were spent primarily in Southern Rhodesia, causing resentment
among the "white" settlers of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. ZAMBIA: A COUNTRY
STUDY, supra note 14, at 33-34.
33. Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Dissolution Order in Council, 1963. See
also infra note 50 and accompanying text.
34. Mining Proclamation, No. 1 of 1912. This system survived with little substantive
change in the 1958 Mining Ordinance, No. 13 of 1958 (subsequently repealed and replaced
by Mining Ordinance ch. 91 in Laws of the Republic of Zambia (1965)).
35. See generally Ushewokunze, The Legal Framework of Copper Production in
Zambia, 6 ZAMBIA LAW JOURNAL 75, 77-78 (1974). Prior to the Mining Ordinance of
1912, the BSAC granted mining rights by an "exchange of letter." These exchanges set
forth important information such as a description of the area and the number of claims
within the area. Further, the grantee was obligated to grant to the BSAC a certain equity
share in the company formed to work the area covered. Id. at 78.
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mining rights.3 6 Although the statute increased interest in mining to a
certain extent, investors continued to overlook the vast potential of the
territory.3 7
The effects of World War I and the enormous growth of the elec-
trical and automotive industries greatly increased the demand for cop-
per. The BSAC began to grant vast, exclusive mining concessions to
large, well-financed companies. 38 By the end of the 1920's, two for-
eign companies, Roan Select Trust Company, a United States concern,
and the South African-controlled Anglo-American Group had devel-
oped into the dominant mining companies in Northern Rhodesia.39
The end of the 1930's saw Northern Rhodesia emerge as one of
the world's leading copper producers.4) Rearmament and the coming
of World War II greatly stimulated the demand for copper. Copper
had become the cornerstone of Northern Rhodesia's economy,
accounting for up to ninety percent of its exports.41
The demand for labor spread in the territory. In 1930, over
20,000 African laborers worked in the Copperbelt, roughly one-third
of the Africans employed in the territory. By 1940, this number had
increased to 40,000.42 Thousands more were employed to service the
mines and towns that grew up in the Copperbelt.43
Although growth of the Copperbelt greatly increased the overall
wealth of the territory, much of the revenue was diverted from the
Northern Rhodesian government. As "owner" of the mineral rights,
the BSAC received considerable sums in the form of royalties. 44 Esti-
mates suggest that by 1964, the BSAC had received over £135 million
in pre-tax revenue from its mining royalties.45 Because the BSAC had
a right to these royalties-even if the concession-holder did not make
a profit46-mining companies had little incentive to invest in mining
operations not yielding an immediate profit.
36. J.A. BANCROFT, supra note 4, at 62.
37. Id.
38. The size of these concessions was staggering. The first such concession granted by
the BSAC was for an area of about 50,000 square miles. Id. at 74.
39. Id. at 78.
40. For a detailed discussion of the growth of Northern Rhodesia's copper industry,
see A. ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 185-94.
41. Id. at 186.
42. Id.
43. Despite the growing demand for labor, Northern Rhodesia still served as a source
of exported labor. By the mid-1930's, more than 50,000 Northern Rhodesian laborers
worked in Southern Rhodesia. Further, the gold fields of Tanganyika in East Africa
employed over 10,000 workers from Northern Rhodesia. ZAMBIA: A COUNTRY STUDY,
supra note 14, at 27.
44. These royalties varied, but on the average the BSAC received between 121/2 and 13
percent of the value of the copper produced. A. ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 229.
45. Ushewokunze, supra note 35, at 79.
46. A. ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 192.
[Vol. 19:1
ZAMBIAN MINING LEGISLATION
The BSAC was not the only economic drain on Northern Rhode-
sian copper revenues. Because the BSAC's headquarters were located
in London, the British government also received a share of the copper
industry's revenue in the form of taxes.47 The taxes levied by the
Northern Rhodesian government remained low due to the considera-
ble influence exerted by the mining companies. 48 These factors
resulted in a low share of the profits for Northern Rhodesia. In 1937,
for example, over thirty percent of the value of the copper produced
was paid out as royalties and taxes. Of this thirty percent, only twelve
and one-half percent remained in the hands of the Northern Rhode-
sian government.49
The years of the Central African Federation (1958-1963) led to
further economic drain on Northern Rhodesia. Under the terms of
the Confederation, all income received from the territories of North-
ern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland were combined in a
federal pool, from which Northern Rhodesia received considerably
less than its proportional share.50 The Confederation's dissolution in
1963 thus offered the prospect of relief for financially-troubled North-
ern Rhodesia.
C. ZAMBIAN INDEPENDENCE AND THE REPEAL OF THE OLD
MINING SYSTEM
1. Acquisition of the British South African Company's
mineral rights
In the months prior to Zambia's proposed independence, Zam-
bian leaders were anxious to secure the BSAC's mineral rights, and
hence, the huge royalties to which the BSAC was entitled. The leaders
argued that the Company had no recognizable legal title to these min-
eral rights.51 On the eve of independence, the BSAC bowed to this
pressure and agreed to surrender its mineral rights and royalties to the
Zambian government. In return, the BSAC was to receive token pay-
47. It is estimated that from 1930-1940, the British government received over
£2,400,000 in taxes from the Copperbelt. Northern Rhodesia received less than £136,000
from the British government as aid during the same period. Id. at 192-93.
48. Ushewokunze, supra note 35, at 79.
49. A. ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 193.
50. Southern Rhodesia exercised the dominant position in the Federation. Salisbury,
the capital of Southern Rhodesia, was also the Federation capital and served as the business
center of the Federation. By 1959, Northern Rhodesia had suffered a net loss of more than
£ 50 million to the rest of the Federation. By 1963, this amount had risen to £ 97 million.
A further disadvantage was that Northern Rhodesia could no longer determine its own rate
of income tax. It could do nothing to reduce the massive flow of dividends and royalties
out of the country. Id. at 213-14.
51. A. ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 222. Allegations had long been made that the BSAC
had no legal basis. The British government never seriously considered these allegations.
See also supra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
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ments of £ 2 million from both the governments of Zambia and Great
Britain.52
On October 24, 1964, Northern Rhodesia became the independ-
ent state of Zambia. Although the Zambian government was now the
sole possessor of the mineral rights previously claimed by the BSAC,
the mining companies-notably Anglo-American and Roan Select
Trust-still had full possession of the mining rights which the BSAC
had granted in "perpetuities. ' '53 The concessions granted to the com-
panies covered large tracts of undeveloped mining land along the Cop-
perbelt 5 4 Even though the Zambian government was receiving a
larger share of mineral royalties,55 it had no legal authority to control
either the rate of production or investments in the mines.
Prior to 1969, Zambia disclaimed any intention of nationalizing
the copper industry. As Zambian President Kuanda stated, the indus-
try was "too big to handle."'5 6 Nevertheless, arguments for nationali-
zation began to grow within the country. Many Zambians felt that if
the mines were controlled by the State, new mines would develop and
resources would be utilized in Zambia's interest rather than in favor of
private, foreign interests.57
Future investment in the mining industry became key to the
nationalization issue. More investment, it was argued, would lead to
more output, which would help protect the industry from a fall in
prices. 58 Furthermore, additional output would mean an increase in
Zambian employment. 59 The mining companies had done little to
develop new mines and increase output. The pre-independence system
of royalties and the export tax (which were levied regardless of
whether the company made a profit) discouraged investment in any
venture which would not yield an immediate profit.6o
The Zambian government gradually came to regard nationaliza-
tion as a means to obtain influence on management policies. With this
52. A. ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 222.
53. The Zambian government inherited the BSAC's legal framework. It had not
acquired the BSAC's holdings in the various companies. Further, the new government
could only make grants of mining rights in areas not covered by valid grants from the
BSAC. Ushewokunze, supra note 35, at 79.
54. Id.
55. For example, the new Zambian government enacted tax schemes to enhance reve-
nues. In 1966, the government enacted the Copper (Export Tax) Act. This tax was
intended to take into account the increased world prices of copper. It applied to the
amount over £600 London Metal Exchange price per ton of exported copper.
Ushewokunze, supra note 35, at 80.
56. A. ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 230.
57. See generally Ndulo, The Nationalization of the Zambian Copper Industry, 6
ZAMBIA LAW JOURNAL 55 (1974).
58. Id. at 55-58. See also A. ROBERTS, supra, note 6, at 230.
59. Ndulo, supra note 57, at 55-58.
60. Id. See also supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
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influence, the government hoped to secure training and employment of
Zambians in technical and managerial positions.61 As one commenta-
tor noted: "The industry was basically owned and operated by foreign
companies, which imported investment capital; and their technical
and managerial manpower requirements, to utilize the huge pool of
cheap labour, and export the profits."'62
2. Nationalization achieved through the Mines and Minerals Act
In June of 1969, President Kuanda set about nationalizing the
copper industry. The first step was to amend the Zambian Constitu-
tion to remove a clause which prevented the government from acquir-
ing private property by compulsory order.63 Nationalization was
implemented by enacting the Mines and Minerals Act of 1969.4
Under this Act, the undeveloped concessions and special grants owned
by the Anglo-American and Roan Select Trust companies were termi-
nated, releasing areas in which the companies were not carrying out
mining operations. 65 The Act also authorized the state to negotiate
with the mining companies for a takeover of a fifty-one percent equity
share in existing mines.66 The details were settled in negotiations with
the companies. The government arranged to buy out a majority share
with dividends over the next eight to twelve years.67
The Mines and Minerals Act of 1969 effectively gave the Zambian
government control over the copper industry. The Act authorized the
government to issue licenses contingent upon productive use. More-
over, the Act increased the government's ability to direct new mining
investment to rural areas outside the Copperbelt.
The remaining sections of this Article will focus on the reforms of
the 1969 Act. The 1969 Act and its subsequent reforms in 1976 were
intended to stabilize the development of mining by emphasizing more
production and exploration and more effective mining techniques and
conservation of resources. This Article concludes that, in light of
Zambia's large dependence upon a single resource, stable economic
growth has best been served by governmental control under the 1969
Mines Act.
61. See Ushewokunze, supra note 35, at 80.
62. Id.
63. Upon independence, the rights of the mining companies were safeguarded in the
independence Constitution of Zambia. The Constitution could only be amended by a refer-
endum vote in which the state had to secure 51% support of all voters on the voters' roll.
Zambia Independence Constitution § 18 (1964). See A. ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 230; see
also Ushewokunze, supra note 35, at 80.
64. Mines and Minerals Act, supra note 2.
65. See Ushewokunze, supra note 35, at 80-81.
66. Id. See also A. ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 230-31.
67. See generally Ndulo, supra note 57.
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II
SOURCES OF LAW RELATING TO MINING
RIGHTS
A. THE ZAMBIAN LEGAL SYSTEM
In order to understand the application of Zambian mining law, it
is important to understand the sources from which the law is derived.
Like most Zambian law, Zambian mining law is comprised of custom-
ary law, English common law, and laws enacted by the Zambian Par-
liament 68 to regulate mining practices and the acquisition of mining
rights.
Legislation is the most important source of Zambian mining law.
Although Zambia initially adopted the pre-independence legislation of
Northern Rhodesia,69 it later enacted significant legislation70 that
repealed much of the colonial legislation. Such legislation included
the Copper (Export) Tax of 1966,71 the Income Tax Act 72 and the
Minerals Tax Act of 1970. 73
The most important legislation affecting mining in Zambia, how-
ever, is the Mines and Minerals Act of 1969, 74 which has served as the
foundation of governmental control over Zambia's mining industry.
As with all Zambian mining legislation, the Mines Act strives to maxi-
mize benefits from the mining industry to the Zambian economy.
Common law is another important source of Zambian mining
law. Like most former British Colonies, Zambia inherited a legal sys-
tem of common law.75 Chapter 4 of the Laws of Zambia expressly
provides that the following shall be in force: (a) the common law, (b)
the doctrines of equity, (c) the statutes in force in England on August
17, 1911, and (d) any later British statute applied to Zambia.76
Accordingly, in the absence of express Zambian authority, the Zam-
68. Such Parliamentary laws include both colonial and post-independence enactments.
69. The first major mining legislation in colonial Northern Rhodesia was the 1912
Mining Proclamation, which was later replaced by the 1958 Mining Ordinance. Mining
Proclamation, No. 1 of 1912; Mining Ordinance, No. 13 of 1958. These Acts served pri-
marily to facilitate the BSAC's granting of mineral concessions. See generally
Ushewokunze, supra note 35, at 77-78.
70. Numerous sections of other statutes affect Zambian mining. Among these, the
Water Act has had a pronounced effect. Water Act, 1972, LAWS OF ZAMBIA, ch. 312.
71. Copper (Export) Tax Act, 1966.
72. Income Tax Act, LAWS OF ZAMBIA, ch. 668.
73. Minerals Tax Act, 1970.
74. Mines and Minerals Act, supra note 2.
75. For a detailed discussion of the common law in Zambia see Church, The Common
Law and Zambia, 6 ZAMBIA LAW JOURNAL 1 (1974). As Prof. Church notes, section 4 of
the Zambia Independence Order, 1964, expressly provided that the existing laws were to
continue in force. Id. at 23.
76. English Law (Extent and Application) Act, 1970, LAWS OF ZAMBIA, ch. 4; see
generally Church, supra note 75, at 24-25.
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bian courts routinely refer to British decisions and other common law
decisions. At the same time, Zambian courts attempt to tailor the law
to the social and economic needs of Zambia. The customary law of
Zambia can greatly influence the way in which courts apply the com-
mon law of other jurisdictions. 77 In applying common law to mining,
Zambian courts have emphasized decisions from countries with simi-
lar socio-economic conditions. Apart from coal mining, Britain is not
a great mining country. Consequently, Zambia has looked more fre-
quently to the common law of such countries as South Africa, which
has an active mining industry.
B. THE ZAMBIAN APPROACH TO MnERAL RIGHTS
The Zambian government that replaced colonial Northern Rho-
desia brought with it new concerns for the mining industry. Whereas
the private mining companies that had prospered under the colonial
regime were primarily concerned with profit maximization, the gov-
ernment's concerns included employment, foreign exchange, trade bal-
ance, and the preservation of resources. Particularly because minerals
are exhaustible resources, government control of the mining industry
was important. A government, for example, is more likely to be con-
cerned with the preservation of resources for future generations and
therefore to choose a more conservative path of development than a
private company. Consequently, upon becoming independent, the
Zambian government acquired all mining rights previously held by
BSAC or by companies to which BSAC had granted concessions.78
Under the Zambian system of mineral rights, the President holds
the property rights to all minerals in Zambia on behalf of the people. 79
State ownership of mineral resources provides the state with exclusive
power over the property within its boundaries, whether mined by the
state, its citizens, or foreign companies. The state enjoys this right
notwithstanding other equal legal rights in the land and the property
77. Customary law, as used in this context, refers to the unique customs which have
developed among the indigenous tribes of Central Africa. Customary laws are not national
in scope, but rather are unique to a particular area as they develop along tribal lines. Most
private legal relationships in Zambia are governed by customary law.
78. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text. The extent of these holdings were
increased with the nationalization of the copper industry in 1969. See supra notes 63-67
and accompanying text.
79. Section 3(1) of the Mines and Minerals Act reads in part: "All rights of ownership
in, of searching for, mining and disposing of, minerals, are hereby vested in the President
on behalf of the Republic." Mines and Minerals Act, supra note 2, § 3(1). In most coun-
tries, the sovereign interest in the mineral resources is recognized to some degree. It has
usually been recognized that the sovereign may have an overriding interest in the essential
and irreplaceable resources. See, eg., Mines and Minerals Act, LAWS OF BOTSWANA, ch.
66.01; Mines and Minerals Act, § 4 LAWS OF KENYA, ch. 306.
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surrounding the minerals.80 This approach enables the state to pro-
vide such incentives as the granting of mining rights on private land,
thereby obviating the need for the mining right holder to purchase
land.81
The state regards its ownership of mineral rights as inalienable.8 2
No provision in the mining laws permits the state to transfer owner-
ship of its mineral interest. Moreover, the total interest the state may
grant under the mining laws must be less than the state's mineral
interest. When a granted interest terminates, it reverts to the state.
Two other approaches to mineral ownership provide a useful con-
trast to Zambia's system of state ownership under the Mines Act. The
first approach is the lease or "regalien" system, which is presently
employed by the majority of nations, including a large number of
developing countries. Under this system, the state owns the mineral
title and the miner derives his right to extract minerals from a tenure
granted by the state, as opposed to one granted by the land owner.8 3
The miner's tenure is seldom equivalent to a fee title, but is rather a
bundle of rights and obligations, the composition of which varies
greatly from country to country.
The second approach to mineral rights allows mineral ownership
to correspond with the ownership of the land surface. Under this sys-
tem, any individual possessing the land has the right to hold, extract,
or dispose of the minerals. This system is commonly referred to as the
claim or "accession" system. In its modem form, the claim system
permits a prospector to obtain private mineral rights by discovering
80. Mines and Minerals Act, supra note 2, § 3(2). Section 3(2) reads: "The provisions
of subsection (1) shall have effect notwithstanding any right of ownership or otherwise
which any person may possess in and to the soil on or under which minerals are found or
situated." The principle of ownership established by section 3 of the Mines Act is based
upon a fundamental distinction between ownership of the surface and ownership of the
subsoil. Although private ownership of real property is fully recognized, ownership of min-
erals imbedded in the soil is vested in the state by virtue of the Mines Act-i.e., the owner
of the land is not the owner of the minerals in it. In this respect, the state's mineral rights
in the land it has parted with are analogous to those of a common-law owner of land in fee
who parts with the land but retains the minerals. See, eg., Ramsey v. Blair, 1 App. Cas. 70
(1976).
81. A problem exists in that a mine is never co-extensive with the surface. No two ore
bodies are alike, since one may continue to great vertical depth while another goes horizon-
tally. This leads to confusion over the ownership of the mine and its exploration where the
owner of land is also the owner of the minerals therein.
82. This view of mineral resources has been encouraged by the work of the United
Nations Permanent Commission on Sovereignty over Natural Resources, Resolution 1803
of 14 December 1962 which affirms "the right of peoples and nations to exercise permanent
sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the interest of
their national development ......
83. The lease system may vary under a "nominal system," under which the minerals
belong to the state. The right to extract the minerals or otherwise dispose of them is
granted to the highest bidder by the state.
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the minerals and registering his claim at a designated office. The claim
system prevails mainly in Western countries.
These two systems of mineral ownership both differ from the
Zambian system because they allow the alienation of mineral owner-
ship. Under the Zambian system, the state's ownership of the miner-
als is inalienable.8 4 The Zambian system, as created by the Mines Act,
is better suited to Zambia's economic planning goals. Minerals, espe-
cially copper, play such a vital role in the economy that the govern-





Mineral extraction requires such large amounts of capital that the
state alone could not efficiently mine all the minerals in the country
even if it so desired. Therefore, to promote the maximum use of min-
eral resources, the state has implemented a system under which pri-
vate individuals and mining companies may develop mineral resources
by obtaining licenses through grants from the state.85
The licenses, created by the Zambian Mines Act, were designed
to maximize the possibility of exploration for mineral resources. The
licenses also retain sufficient sovereign control to ensure that the min-
eral resources are developed in the interests of the national economy
and that the state receives the maximum return from mineral
exploitation.
Three categories of mining rights have been granted under the
Mines Act:86 (1) a prospecting license, (2) an exploration license, and
(3) a mining license.87 The prospecting license grants the fewest privi-
leges, while the mining license grants the most privileges. The licenses
are cumulative, so that the mining license includes the rights to pros-
pect and explore.
84. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
85. The minerals for which licenses may be issued are divided into four major catego-
ries: (1) building minerals (sand, clay, gravel, laterite, limestone, etc.); (2) industrial miner-
als (non-metallic minerals such as graphite, gypsum, and mica, as well as tale, sand, and
dyes used for industrial purposes); (3) reserved minerals (mineral oils, gas, diamonds, emer-
alds, gold, the platinum group and radioactive minerals); and (4) all other minerals. Mines
and Minerals Act, supra note 2, § 2. Licenses for reserved minerals differ from other
licenses only insofar as other licenses include conditions relating to the disposal of any
reserved minerals. Such conditions are called permits. See Mines and Minerals Act, supra
note 2, § 64.
86. This theme follows a three-stage concept of prospecting, exploration, and mining,
which was also a feature of the pre-1969 Zambian (Northern Rhodesia) legislation.
87. Mines and Minerals Act, supra note 2, §§ 16, 27, and 44.
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An individual may only obtain a mining right, or license, if he is
at least eighteen years of age, a citizen of Zambia, and has been a
resident of Zambia for a period of two years. 88 A company may
obtain a mining right greater than a prospecting license only if it has
been incorporated in Zambia. 9 Holders of mining rights are not
required to pay any fees or rental payments. Therefore, miners may
spend all their funds on actual mining activities.90
L Prospecting license
The prospecting license provides the most restrictive rights under
Zambia's licensing system.91 A prospecting license entitles the holder
to enter freely upon the specified land to search for minerals. A per-
son wishing to obtain prospecting rights over an area can apply for
any number of prospecting licenses. 92 If the applicant is a company, it
must provide the names and nationality of the directors and the names
of any shareholders possessing beneficial ownership of more than five
percent of the issued capital. 93 An applicant for a prospecting license,
like every applicant for any mining right, must demonstrate the finan-
cial and technical capability to mine. The applicant must also specify
the names of the minerals he intends to prospect and give a detailed
description of the area he wishes the license to cover.94
Although prospecting licenses are issued for specified minerals,
individuals and companies are allowed to carry out general reconnais-
sance before applying for a license. When license applications cover
different minerals in the same or overlapping areas, the applications
are considered in the order in which they are received. It is possible
that minerals other than the ones specified in the license may be dis-
covered in the process of prospecting. This possibility is unlikely,
however, because most prospecting licenses include reference to most
common minerals. 95
The need to secure the state's approval for mineral exploration is
based on the assumption that the state owns any minerals discov-
ered.96 Discovery alone does not give the discoverer exploration
rights. Ordinarily, however, an application for exploration after dis-
88. Id. § 5(1)(a)(i) and (ii).
89. Id. § 5(1)(b)(i).
90. This is unusual; most countries demand the payment of rentals.
91. The prospecting license is covered generally by §§ 16-26 of the Mines and Minerals
Act, supra note 2.
92. Id. § 25.
93. Id. § 18.
94. Mines and Minerals Act, supra note 2, § 18.
95. Such practice is only common sense in that it is extremely difficult to project accu-
rately all the minerals one finds in an area.
96. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
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covery is a mere formality. The person who discovers a mineral will
be given the mining rights unless someone else already holds the rights
to that mineral. This policy justly rewards the discoverer for his previ-
ous expenditures in exploration.
Even if an applicant has complied with all of the preliminary
steps required by the Mines Act, the state's authority to grant a pros-
pecting license is discretionary. The mere fact of compliance gives no
inchoate right to a license.97 Once a prospecting license has been
issued, however, the state is committed to issuing subsequent explora-
tion and mining licenses. Both sections 30(1) and 48(1), the provisions
of the Mines Act relating to the grant of these licenses, specify that the
state "shall" (rather than "may") grant the subsequent licenses. 98 Of
course, the mandatory grant is contingent upon the applicant's dis-
charge of his obligations, his presentation of reasonable evidence of
mineralization in the specified area, and his proposal of an acceptable
plan for the next stage.99
No later than two months before the expiration of his license, a
holder of a prospecting license may apply for and obtain an explora-
tion license. The exploration license is limited to the area and miner-
als specified in his prior prospecting license.'0° If the holder wishes, he
may apply directly for a mining license.101
2. Exploration license
Exploration licenses grant exclusive rights to the areas specified
therein. Such exclusiveness may be inferred from the fact that section
19 of the Mines Act does not permit the granting of prospecting
licenses for areas covered by exploration licenses. Moreover, section
31(c) of the Act prohibits the grant of exploration rights to areas
which overlap mining areas.
An exploration license not issued upon the expiration of a pros-
pecting license is limited to an area of ten square kilometers.10 2 This
size limitation ensures that very large areas of land will not be held for
long periods unless exploration actually occurs. Without this limita-
97. Presumably, an aggrieved party can challenge the rejection of his license, if such
rejection is based on reasons other than those provided for in Zambian mining laws, by
applying to the High Court for certiorari. See generally Patel v. A.G., Selected Judgments
of Zambia, No. 1 of 1968.
98. Mines and Minerals Act, supra note 2, §§ 30 (1), 48(1). Section 31 of the Mines
Act establishes specific grounds for which the Chief Engineer shall reject an application for
an exploration license.
99. In this way, the state has limited its discretion in granting or withholding explora-
tion and mining licenses. See generally Mines and Minerals Act, supra note 2, §§ 30(l),
48(1).
100. Id. § 27.
101. Id. § 45.
102. Id. § 36(2).
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tion, more land than an individual could reasonably explore would be
withheld from competitive prospecting and exploration. If, however,
geological evidence indicates that a more extensive body of ore exists,
the holder of the exploration license may apply to extend his area with
reasonable certainty of approval.103
3. Mining license
The mining license provides the holder with the broadest range of
rights. "[T]he holder of a prospecting licence or an exploration licence
may... obtain a mining licence.., for any area or areas within his
prospecting area or exploration area.., and in respect of any mineral
covered by his licence."' 1 4 A mining license may cover only the esti-
mated area of the mineral deposit. 0 -5 The license may, however,
include such additional areas as are reasonably required to protect the
machinery used to carry out the mining operations.' 0 6 The mining
license, like the exploration license, is exclusive.
The mining license vests in the holder the right to mine-i.e., the
right to perform the entire operation from extracting the minerals to
processing them for industrial use. As with both the prospecting and
exploration licenses, the rights under a mining license may not be
transferred without the state's approval.10 7
The state's authority to forbid the transfer of mining rights with-
out prior approval is justifiable. Mining rights are valuable assets and
are thus natural targets for speculators who recognize the potential for
obtaining considerable revenue from those rights. Speculators, how-
ever, may hold the land and choose not to extract the minerals, which
would thereby prevent a benefit to the state economy. State approval
based upon actual intent to extract minerals prevents mining compa-
nies from obtaining large profits by simply selling and reselling mining
rights. Furthermore, the approval requirement provides the state with
a means of ensuring that transferees of mining rights possess the finan-
cial and technical ability to extract the minerals.108
103. This seems to be an implicit aspect of § 36 (1) and (2). Id.
104. Id. § 45.
105. The Minister shall reject an application for a mining license if. "(a) the applicant
was not, on the date his application was received by the Minister, the holder of a prospect-
ing license or an exploration license covering the proposed area and the minerals to be
included .... ." Id § 49(l)(a). Further, such application shall be rejected if the applicant
has not properly demarcated the proposed mining area in accordance with section 46. Id.
§ 49(1)(d). Under section 46, a mining site demarcated shall not exceed the estimated
extent of mineral deposit. Id. § 46 (1)(a).
106. Id.
107. Id. § 58.
108. Sections 39 and 58 authorize the Minister to inquire into the particulars concerning
the proposed transfer. As to a mining license, the Minister shall reject the application on
the basis of the proposed transferee's lack of adequate financial resources. Id. § 58(3).
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B. THE NATURE OF THE MINING INTEREST
1. General nature of the interest
In order to appreciate the degree of control exercised by the Zam-
bian government, one must have a clear understanding of the nature of
the mining right created by a mining license. As observed, a mining
right in Zambia gives the holder the right to prospect, explore, exploit,
and process the minerals within the terms of the license for a specified
number of years. These rights are renewable provided that the holder
observes and fulfills all obligations demanded by the state.
The Mines Act, by its terms and in actual practice, indicates that
the grant of exclusive mining rights includes two separate interests: an
interest in the surface covered by the license and an interest in the
minerals within the bounds of the license. The license holder's interest
in the minerals derives entirely from the statute; the holder may not
negotiate with the government for any other rights. Because the
Mines Act vests the right to mine and dispose of all minerals in the
state,109 the license holder's rights in the minerals are restricted. The
terms under which the license is held and the interpretation of those
terms, the definition of rights and their scope, and the reciprocal obli-
gations between the license holder and the government are absolutely
fixed by the Mines Act. The license holder's surface interest is also
limited: the miner may only use the surface of the land covered by his
license in ways which will not interfere with the main purpose of his
tenure-i.e., the miner's surface use may not interfere with the extrac-
tion of minerals.
The granting of interests under a mining license should be distin-
guished from legal title to the land and minerals, which is split. As
owner, the state holds title to both the minerals and the land. How-
ever, the right to use the land and title to the minerals pass to the
holder of the mining license after extraction.
2. Nature of the relationship between the state and mining right
holder
The exact nature of the relationship created between the state and
a mining rights holder has not been judicially interpreted in Zambia.
A number of South African cases, however, have discussed this rela-
tionship. The government of South Africa, like the government of
Zambia, possesses the right to mine and grants mining licenses. South
Africa has had a great deal of influence in shaping the Zambian min-
ing laws, and South African cases therefore offer some instruction for
Zambian courts.
109. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
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The early case of Neebe v. Register of Mining Rights '10 considered
the relationship between the state and the mining rights holder in
some detail. In this case, Neebe applied for an order of the Registrar
of Mining Rights to pass and register a transfer of prospecting claims
as property rights. The Court rejected this classification of the rights
and concluded that the nature of such a mining right is sui generis-
especially created by statute-and that the incidents of tenure must be
read from the terms of the statute which establishes tenure.
The Supreme Court of the Cape Province df South Africa like-
wise refused to classify claims in a diamond mine as property rights.
In the case of South African Loan and Mortgage Agency v. Cape of
Good Hope Bank,1I the Court distinctly stated that the licenses deal-
ing with diamond mines clearly do not convey property rights. The
Court added that the mining license holder takes no title to minerals
which have not been extracted. Rather, the holder takes title upon
extraction, at which time the minerals become personal property.
Interpreted according to the South African approach to mining
rights, Zambian mining rights provide only a bare license to mine. No
interest passes in the unsevered minerals; the holder of the right
acquires an interest only after the minerals have been extracted. 112
The exercise of mining rights can be restrained because the rights
derive from the mining statutes. In fact, the state may even impose
new obligations, notwithstanding conflicting provisions or rules in
existence when the mining right was granted. New restrictions and
obligations which adversely affect existing mining rights holders are
unlikely, however, because such changes might intimidate mining
investors. Investment would become less attractive if miners were
unable to forecast the nature and extent of their license obligations and
rights.
If regulations require change, the state will most likely follow the
pattern established in 1969: the state will treat the rights of existing
license holders as a separate issue and arrange amicable settlements
with them. In 1969, the introduction of the new system of mining
rights extinguished all pre-existing prospecting and mining rights.
Provision was then made for the immediate granting of mining
licenses to protect the producing mines.
110. [1902] Transvaal Law Reports 65.
111. 11 S.C. 163 (1886).
112. Robinson v. Blundell [1867] Macassey's Reports (N.Z.) 683; see also R. v. Fayle, 27
L.T. 64 (1972) and Low Moor Co. v. The Stanley Coal Co., 33 L.T. 436 (1875) (action for
trespass for unlawfully working coal belonging to plaintiffs).
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3. Mining rights and surface rights
A person who acquires a mining right does not thereby acquire
surface rights to the land; rather, the state retains the surface rights.
Title to the surface is a very important issue to both mining right hold-
ers and surface owners. 113 The mining right holder may need the sur-
face for mining as well as for purposes ancillary to mining, such as the
milling, processing, and refining of the minerals extracted and the con-
struction of the necessary plant, works, and buildings. Furthermore,
the surface land linked to mining rights may be needed for building
roads or for providing services, such as electric power and water sup-
ply, or for establishing a mine township.The land owner, on the other
hand, may utilize the surface for agricultural or other development
purposes.
During prospecting operations, the mining right holder and the
surface owner have little cause for disagreement. Once exploration
and mining activities have started, however, the opportunity for dis-
pute increases markedly. The mining right holder may need certain
portions of the land for exclusive use. Meanwhile, the surface right
owner may wish to run his cattle over the tract upon which mining
operations are being conducted. The miner may use such large quanti-
ties of water that other users find themselves faced with a water
shortage. The mining right holder's right to use the surface and the
circumstances under which the owner's rights are protected are
strictly regulated under the mining laws.
a. Land rights of mining right holders
A mining right holder enjoys the right to use the surface of public
and private land. He may enter the property covered by his mining
right with his servants and agents, create mining excavations, and
erect any camps, temporary buildings, or machinery needed to con-
duct mining.114 Erecting structures, however, does not confer any
right, title, or interest in the land. The mining right holder must
remove, on or before the termination of his rights, any camps, tempo-
rary buildings, or machinery which he has erected. Further, the right
to surface use does not include a property interest in any products of
the soil.
113. It is important to point out that an understanding of the position under the com-
mon law does not clarify the situation in Zambia. Under the common law, the relative
rights of the land owner and mineral owner are determined by a number of considerations,
particularly the rights conferred upon the mineral owner by the terms of the mining lease,
which severs the mineral rights from the land and expressly or impliedly determines the
question of their relative rights.
114. Mines and Minerals Act, supra note 2, § 53(1).
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A mining license holder may purchase the mining area or obtain
a lease to the land covered by his mining license from the owner of the
surface area. If the land owner refuses to make the land available to
the mining right holder, the President of Zambia may intervene and
acquire the land in the name of the state for use by the holder of the
mining license. 115 Before the President may acquire the land, how-
ever, the holder of the mining right must prove that he has taken all
reasonable steps to acquire the land or the desired right peacefully but
has been unsuccessful. 1 6 To avoid an abuse of presidential power,
compulsory acquisition should be a last resort for the mining right
holder.117
Every person exercising a mining right is required to give notice
that he intends to exercise such right. In fact, exercise of the right is
conditioned upon such notice. The notice must state the area covered
by the right and the right's date of expiration.11 8
The notice requirement enables the surface owner to make
arrangements to move livestock to other pastures, to gather crops in
the area, and to otherwise prevent predictable mishaps from occur-
ring. In this way, the surface owner mitigates damages consequent to
mining activities. Without notice, damages could prove quite substan-
tial because the surface owner or occupier of any land within a mining
area has the right to allow his livestock to graze and to cultivate the
surface as long as these activities do not interfere with prospecting,
exploration, or mining.
This notion of non-interference also carries over to construction
of new buildings. Having received notice that a person intends to
exercise a mining right, the owner of surface rights must obtain the
miner's consent before erecting any new buildings or structures. 119
b. Water rights of mining right holders
The traditional common law concept applicable to water
problems relating to mining is riparianism. A variety of rights to
water, known as riparian rights, arise solely from ownership of land
adjoining a natural stream. Under the natural flow concept of ripari-
anism, all riparian owners are entitled to have the streams on their
land flow naturally. Except for minor domestic uses, no riparian
115. Id. § 79.
116. Id
117. When the land is compulsorily acquired, compensation for the land is payable by
the mining right holder at a rate determined by the President. Mines and Minerals Act,
supra note 2, § 80. Section 80 states that compensation may be paid by the mining license
holder "as the President may decide to be adequate." The Mines Act does not provide
guidelines for how the compensation is to be measured.
118. Mines and Minerals Act, supra note 2, § 72(3).
119. Id § 74.
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owner may impair the quantity or quality of the stream's flow so as to
cause injury to another riparian owner.
Mine workings by their very nature tend to interfere with water
resources on a mining site. They may, for instance, intercept subterra-
nean waters as an incident of the mining activities. The natural course
of the subterranean waters would thereby be altered, causing the
waters to flow along the mine workings. From there, the waters are
either drained or pumped to the surface and very often are discharged
at places other than their natural surface outlets.
Zambian law, however, overrides these traditional common law
concepts. The water rights of the mining right holder are to be exer-
cised in conformity with the Water Act, 120 which totally deprives the
riparian owner of his common law rights. The Water Act generally
divides water rights into three groups: primary use, covering domestic
purposes; secondary use, covering irrigation; and tertiary use, covering
industrial purposes.1 21 The holder of a mining right may use private
water on the land under his control. However, he must do so with due
regard to other water users, who are entitled to relief if any contami-
nation of the water interferes with the water's primary use.
If a miner wishes to use public water, he must apply to the Water
Board. 122 The Board, created by the Water Act, will grant permission
for use of a reasonable quantity of water if such use does not prejudice
the holder of existing rights. If, however, others enjoy beneficial use of
the water by virtue of a statutory or contractual right from the state,
then the grant will be made only after full inquiry and payment of
compensation.123
In addition to the water rights obtainable from the Water Board,
the Mines and Minerals Act authorizes the holder of a mining right to
lay water pipes and water courses; create ponds, dams, and reservoirs;
and construct drains, sewers, and sewage disposal plants. 124
c. Dominant interest
A mining right holder's right to use the surface is superior to that
of the surface owner-i.e., the mining right is the dominant interest.
Section 74 of the Mines Act suggests this dominance of the mining
right; provisions of the Act relating to the compulsory acquisition of
120. Water Act, 1972, THE LAWS OF ZAMBIA, ch. 312. Section 53(1) of the Mines and
Minerals Act specifies mining right holders must act in conformity with the Water Act
provisions.
121. See Water Act, supra note 120, § 2.
122. Id. § 15.
123. Id. § 16.
124. Mines and Minerals Act, supra note 2, § 53(l)(g).
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land for mining purposes reinforce section 74.125 Mining officials
grant mining rights with no regard to the present use of the land. The
state and its mining officials clearly give priority to mineral develop-
ment and exploration over all other uses of land, such as agricultural
and residential uses. The reason for this practice is that mineral
deposits are rare and their location is determined by the country's geo-
logical formation; minerals must therefore be mined wherever they lie.
As a matter of law, a mining right holder has the right to use,
damage, or destroy the surface, subject to the limitations imposed by
section 73 of the Mines Act. 126 Section 73 provides that the holder of
a mining right shall exercise his rights reasonably and in a manner
which minimally affects the interests of any owner or occupier of the
land. Surface use is thus restricted to those uses that are "reasonably
necessary" to mining operations.
Section 73 appears to impose two limitations. First, the state or
the surface owner may intervene when a particular use of the surface
lacks a legitimate or reasonable relationship to mining activities. 127
The test for intervention is whether the use is necessary or incidental
to production. 128 Although considerations of custom, usage, and pru-
dent operation may be weighed, these considerations should not be
determining factors.
Second, section 73 imposes an obligation on the mining right
holder not to create a public nuisance or a danger to public health.
Liability extends to all surface damage resulting from the mining right
holder's negligence, even if the holder's use of the surface was not
unreasonable. 129
Section 76 of the Mines Act goes further than section 73 to
impose liability on a mining right holder; section 76 imposes liability
for damage in certain situations where the holder's activity was not
even negligent. The relevant part of section 76 provides:
125. Id. §§ 79-80.
126. Id. § 73. Section 73 reads: "The rights conferred by a mining right shall be exer-
cised reasonably and so as to affect injuriously the interests of any miner or occupier of the
land on which such rights are exercised to the minimum extent necessitated by the reason-
able and proper conduct of the operations concerned."
127. For example, it would not be permissible for the mining right holder to use the
surface land and its resources for non-mining purposes, e.g., to set up a golf course. Simi-
larly, if a mining right holder cuts timber with the intent to sell, he will be stopped. Also,
although a mining right holder is entitled to erect and occupy houses, he may not rent
houses to persons other than his own employees. See generally Mines and Minerals Act,
supra note 2, § 73.
128. Id.
129. Here again, one is faced with a very nebulous term. What does and does not consti-
tute "reasonable and proper conduct" in mining practice will depend on the facts of each
case. Any attempt to formulate a general definition would be unpractical.
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[W]henever in the course of prospecting, exploration or mining operations any
disturbance of the rights of the owner or occupier of lands or damage to any
crops, trees, buildings, stock, or works thereon is caused, the holder of the
mining rights by virtue of which such operations are or were carried out shall
be liable to pay to such owner or occupier fair and reasonable compensation for
such disturbances or damage according to their respective rights or interests (if
any) in the property concerned .... 130
The statute requires the parties to decide what compensation is fair
and reasonable. If the parties cannot agree, the issue is referred to the
Chief Mining Engineer and dealt with as a mining dispute. 131
4. Nature of the mining right vis-d-vis third parties
The Mines Act's distinction between surface rights and mineral
rights also has implications with respect to third parties. Situations
often arise in which a third party other than the state interferes with
the rights of a mining rights holder. Two frequent types of interfer-
ence are unauthorized entry into the mining territory, either upon or
beneath the surface, and deliberate and unlawful extraction of miner-
als, sometimes by the surface owner.
The remedies of a mining right holder for wrongful interference
by the surface owner or another third party are determined according
to general rules of law. Since a mining right holder has no proprietary
interest in minerals not yet extracted, the holder cannot recover the
value of minerals wrongfully extracted by third parties. The right to
recover the value of the minerals belongs to the state. 132 The state,
however, as owner of the extracted minerals, must attempt to protect
its ownership rights against injury,133 whereas the mining right holder
has no obligation to protect minerals from third parties.
A third party's removal of minerals undoubtedly infringes upon
the mining right holder's ability to exercise his mining rights. Thus,
although the mining right holder cannot recover the value of minerals
wrongfully extracted, the holder can sue third parties for the invasion
of his exclusive right to mine. The right to bring suit in such a situa-
tion derives from common law. At common law, when an exclusive
license is granted, no one may interfere with the operations of the
license or deprive the holder of the license's benefits.134
This common law principle is illustrated in Fitzgerald v.
Firbank13 5 In that case, the defendant deeded the exclusive fishing
130. Mines and Minerals Act, supra note 2, § 76.
131. Id. § 77.
132. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
133. Section 133 of the Mines and Minerals Act sets forth the offense of wrongfully
removing minerals. Id.
134. Newby v. Harrison, 4 L.T.R. (n.s.) 397 (1861).
135. Fitzgerald v. Firbank, [1897] 2 Ch. 96.
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rights in a defined part of a river to the plaintiff for a term of years.
Later, the defendant wrongfully discharged water containing sediment
into the stream. The sediment drove the fish away and impaired their
breeding. The court upheld the plaintiff's claim for damages, ruling
that the plaintiff had a right of action against anyone who wrongfully
acted in a manner which adversely affected the exercise of his deeded
rights.
The Court followed the Fitzgerald reasoning in Nkumbula v.
Mining Industrial Development Corporation,136 where the Chief Min-
ing Engineer assessed damages for the removal of the minerals, minus
the costs of extraction. Such an action does not rest upon the holder's
right to a property interest in the unsevered minerals; rather, it rests
upon the taking of the right to possible future possession of the
minerals.
One holding mining rights in Zambia can also maintain an action
in conversion to recover extracted minerals which have been removed
from the mining premise, as title to such severed minerals legally rests
with the mining right holder.137 Conversion of such minerals clearly
deprives the holder of his property interest in the minerals. 38
C. OBLIGATIONS ON THE MINING RIGHT HOLDER UNDER THE
MINES ACT
In order to encourage the discovery and rapid development of
mineral deposits, the Mines Act imposes a system of development obli-
gations on the mining right holder.139 These obligations prevent the
pre-independence problem of mining right holders' failing to develop
huge tracts of land and rather holding them for speculative purposes.
Other obligations imposed on mining right holders, however, are
designed to ensure that mining proceeds with minimal disturbance to
the environment. 140 The mining right holder is thus subject to con-
flicting obligations.
1. Obligations Designed to Influence the Rate of Development
A number of methods to increase the rate of mineral production
have evolved from the mining laws. Among the most important are
the following: (1) restriction of exploration licenses to a short period
of time; (2) stated work and production requirements; (3) payment of
advance royalties; (4) surtaxes for failure to reach production quotas;
136. Chief Mining Engineer's file on display at Ministry of Mines and Industry, Lusaka.
137. See supra Part III (B) (1)-(2).
138. Id.
139. Mines and Minerals Act, supra note 2, § 54.




and (5) the surface tax. These methods enable the state to set and
attain a desired level of mineral production within a short period of
time. The problem remains, however, that these methods to increase
production often result in wasteful mining techniques.
The solution adopted under the Mines Act embodies some of the
above approaches, but attempts to avoid the negative consequences.
First, the Mines Act sets clear time limits on the period for which a
license is valid, with periods varying depending on the type of license
sought. For example, a prospecting license is valid for a maximum
period of four years with no express right of renewal.141 Mining offi-
cials suggest that if a prospector cannot find minerals within four
years, he should not be entitled to retain his prospecting license. The
holder of a prospecting license that is about to expire may, however,
apply for a new license over the whole or any part of his original area,
but would then have to compete with any other interested parties.
An exploration license, on the other hand, is initially valid for up
to three years with a right of renewal for two more years, providing
always that the progress achieved is satisfactory and the program for
future operations is adequate. 142 The state, in fact, will almost cer-
tainly extend the period of renewal beyond two years in special
circumstances.
Finally, a mining license is initially granted for a maximum
period of twenty-five years and may be renewed for a similar period, 143
providing that the miner shows that ore reserves remain to be
exploited 1 " and submits a satisfactory program for future operations
and minimum expenditure.145 Most mining investors, however, con-
sider twenty-five years a sufficient period to recoup one's investment.
Opening and developing a mine takes an average of five years, leaving
the mining right holder twenty years of operation.
In the final analysis, the life of a mining license will naturally
depend upon the quantity and quality of the ore body itself. The
license will normally continue until such time as the specified minerals
are exhausted.
A second means by which the Mines Act influences the rate of
development is to impose obligations requiring the commencement of
141. Mines and Minerals Act, supra note 2, § 18.
142. Id. § 33.
143. Id. § 51(1). The Act also requires the state to renew a license if operations have
been proceeding in the scheduled manner. Section 51 states that the Minister shall only
reject an application for renewal if the miner is in default or the Minister considers that
development has not proceeded with due diligence, minerals in workable quantities do not
remain, or the program of intended operations will not ensure proper conservation and use
of the mineral resources.
144. Id. § 51(4)(ii).
145. Id. § 51(4)(iii).
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operations within a specified time. Similar to the licensing duration
requirements, these start-up obligations vary according to the type of
license desired.
The Act requires the holder of a prospecting license to begin pros-
pecting within three months of the issuance of the license. The state
may extend this period if it is satisfied that more time is required to
make the necessary preparations to carry on prospecting operations.
In any event, the date for commencing prospecting operations cannot
be more than six months after the issuance of the license.146
Moreover, the miner must carry out his prospecting in accord-
ance with a strict program of prospecting operations. The miner must
directly expend not less than a sum of twelve dollars per square mile of
the prospecting area for each year of the license period. 147 In addition,
the miner must submit detailed reports of his operations to the Chief
Mining Engineer.
The Mines Act imposes similar obligations on the holder of an
exploration license. He is required to commence operations within six
months of the issuance of the license.148 He must perform exploration
in accordance with the program of exploration operations. In addi-
tion, he must directly expend the following amounts for each square
mile of the exploration area: not less than $1,000 in the first year,
$2,000 in the second year, and $3,000 in the third year following the
initial grant of the license. During any renewal period of the explora-
tion license, the license holder must expend not less than approxi-
mately $5,000 per square mile of exploration area per year of the
renewal period. 149
Holders of mining licenses are likewise subjected to strict obliga-
tions. Mining officials strongly emphasize that an applicant for any
mining right must submit a program of intended operations.1 50 This
program is one of the more important criteria used in assessing appli-
cations for mining rights. Mining officials examine submitted pro-
grams item by item, and, in effect, approve the program by issuing a
license.
Like the expenditure requirements for both prospecting and
exploration licenses, only direct expenditures fulfill the minimum
expenditure obligations for mining licenses. The work contemplated
146. Id. § 26.
147. Id.
148. Id. § 37.
149. Id. The minimum expenditure obligations of an exploration license are not set by
law as for the holder of a prospecting license. Minimum expenditure obligations have been
set at a low level for prospecting in order to encourage the use of new surveillance tech-
niques over extensive areas.
150. See, e.g., Mines Act, supra note 2, § 47(g).
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by the state, and thus acceptable for inclusion in a program, must bear
some direct relationship to the investigation and development of min-
erals and must tend to facilitate the extraction or investigation of ores
in the licensed area. Labor performed in mining and in making
improvements, such as hoisting machinery, is directly and apparently
related to mining activities; airborne surveys investigating mineral
location are also directly related to mining.
The chief objection to requirements of minimum amounts of
work and expenditures is the mining industry's particular susceptibil-
ity to fluctuating prices. When the price of the product from a partic-
ular mine justifies operations, the mine will be developed or worked
regardless of the minimum work requirement. On the other hand,
during periods of deflated prices, the minimum work requirement
merely adds to the economic woes of the already troubled mining right
holder.
Even if this concern were valid, it would apply only to mining
right holders actually engaged in mining, and not to those persons
acquiring mining properties for speculative purposes, the targets of
this legislation. It is nonetheless important, in light of price fluctua-
tion, to require expenditure levels that are fairly attainable. In prac-
tice, the minimum expenditure levels are far exceeded by most mining
right holders. Indeed, there are cases of extreme expenditure. For
example, in the West Lungula River license area, Road Consolidated
Mines Ltd. initiated helicopter operations because the area was only
accessible by air. Amounts spent to gain access to the area alone were
sufficient to fulfill all expenditure obligations.
Admittedly, as most mining investors protest, minimum expendi-
ture obligations are an awkward means of ensuring that prospecting
operations proceed at an acceptable level. Such obligations entail
much paper work. Furthermore, expenditure returns can be inflated
by mining enforcement officers who do not have a reasonable under-
standing of basic principles of mining. In Zambia, the problem of
unreasonable inflation has been mitigated by the high caliber of the
officials to whom the returns are made.
In addition to the requirement of minimum expenditures, the
Mines Act requires the holder of a mining right to commence produc-
tion on or before the date specified in the development program and to
begin mining operations as of the date by which he intends to work for
profit. 151 He must develop and mine the mineral deposit in accord-
ance with the program of development and mining operations.1 52 In
order to meet the program requirements of section 54 and to be
151. Id. § 54(1)(a).
152. Id. § 54(1)(b).
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acceptable to mining officials, the plan of operations must be quite
detailed. A typical program invariably includes estimated tons of ore
to be mined and milled, planned mine development and exploratory
drilling, estimated mineral production and operating costs, capital
projects, mining methods, and estimated staff and labor requirements.
Finally, a mining right holder must submit reports and informa-
tion about his activities. 53 The contents of the reports are confidential
and can be published or otherwise revealed only with the consent of
the license holder.' 54
2. Obligations concerning the manner in which mining activity
is conducted
In addition to requirements to control the rate of development,
the Mines Act sets forth two sets of requirements to ensure that the
mining activity is performed in an acceptable manner. Although the
objectives of these two sets of requirements are unrelated, both are
equally necessary to prevent excessive development which could lead
to unnecessarily low recovery rates and damage to the environment.
A mining license holder must develop the minerals in accordance
with accepted mining standards that stipulate avoidance of wasteful
mining and metallurgical practices. 55 Consequently, the Mines Act
holds the license holder to a duty of reasonable care and diligence in
conducting mining operations.' 56 When state mining officials discover
that a miner is using wasteful practices, the officials notify the miner
and require him to show cause why he should not cease to use such
practices. 57
Given the utmost importance of controlling mining methods,
state mining officials vigorously enforce existing obligations. Strict
enforcement ensures that minerals are mined economically at maxi-
mum recovery rates with minimal environmental harm.
Sections 54 and 55 of the Mines Act, imposing respectively the
obligations to develop the mines in accordance with a "program of
development and mining operations" and not to use wasteful mining
practices, do not indicate a standard for determining when the mining
153. Id. § 54(1)-(2).
154. Id. § 54(2).
155. Id. § 55(1). Section 55(1) reads:
(1) If the Engineer considers that the holder of a mining license is using wasteful
mining practices or wasteful metallurgical practices, he shall notify the holder
accordingly and require him to show cause within such reasonable time as the
Engineer shall specify in the notification why he should not cease to use such
practices.
156. Id. § 55.
157. Id. § 55(1).
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right holder has breached these obligations.15 8 Theoretically, there are
two possible standards: a good faith standard and the standard of the
prudent mining right holder.
The good faith standard would clearly not be adequate for pur-
poses of control and is not used in practice. The Mines Act impliedly
excludes a good faith standard in that the mining right holder, once
notified of wasteful mining practices, must satisfy the Chief Mining
Engineer that he (the holder) is either not using wasteful practices or
that the use of such practices is justified under the circumstances.' 59
Likewise, in cases where the obligation to develop is breached, the
mining right holder must satisfy the Minister of Mines that the failure
to follow the program of development was justified under the
circumstances. 160
In practice, the state employs the standard of the prudent mining
right holder (sometimes called the standard of accepted mining prac-
tices). The prudent miner standard functions in the same manner as
the reasonable man standard in other areas of the law. The prudent
miner is defined as the hypothetical miner who does what he should do
with respect to mining.
Section 87 of the Mines Act furthers the state's interest in dictat-
ing proper mining methods. This section provides that if, after
inquiry, the Minister of Mines and Industry considers that either the
state's interests or the interests of the mining license holders with
licenses covering continuous or neighboring mining areas will be best
served by merging or coordinating all or part of the operations of such
holders, the Minister may direct these holders to merge or coordinate
within a specified time and upon such terms as he sets.' 6 ' The state,
however, must afford the mining license holders a reasonable opportu-
nity to present their positions in writing before directing any consoli-
dation of mining rights.' 62 It is important that the state not alter
rights involving heavy outlays of capital without providing for plan-
ning of the joint venture.
Merging adjacent mining operations may give rise to a constitu-
tional problem when a mining right holder who opposes a consolida-
tion order claims deprivation of his rights. Because such a claim has
not yet arisen, there are no cases addressing the constitutionality of
consolidation. Analogous situations exist, however, in which the state
has compulsorily taken land in the public interest without the owner's
158. Id. §§ 54, 55.
159. Id. § 55(2).
160. Id. § 54(1)(b).
161. Id. § 87(1).
162. Id.
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approval. 163 If the state makes equitable compensation to one whose
interest is thereby modified, no problem generally arises. 164
3. Consequences of breach of obligations
If the mining right holder breaches his statutory obligations, the
Mines Act gives the government the right to terminate the mining
right. 165 Most mining investors regard this consequence as fair and
the safeguards against such action as adequate. Any holder of a min-
ing right who breaches any provision of the Mines Act or any condi-
tion of his mining permit is also liable for a financial penalty.' 66 For
example, the state may recover any difference between the required
expenditure and the actual expenditure.
These consequences seem harsh, yet their harshness is belied by
the fact that the mining right holder will generally be excused for
breaching an obligation if he can prove that he is not responsible for
the breach.167 A mining right holder will not be deprived of his right,
therefore, unless there is both a breach of obligation and blameworthi-
ness on the part of the mining right holder. The mining right holder
can defend his failure to comply with the Mines Act by proving that
his failure was due to circumstances beyond his control. Similarly, the
holder may prove that there was a reasonable excuse for his failure to
comply with an obligation. For example, the holder can defend a
charge of including false information in a report by proving that the
false information was not intended to deceive. 168 Likewise, in the case
of failure to comply with an order to stop wasteful mining practices,
the holder may present a reasonable excuse for such failure. 169
The breach of any obligation does not ipso facto terminate the
right granted, but merely gives the state the option to terminate the
right.' 70 No mining right has ever been terminated as the result of a
breach. The cases that have arisen have been otherwise resolved. If
the state does terminate the right, the decision may be appealed to the
Mining Affairs Tribunal, which has power to amend or vary the state's
decisions. 17 1
163. See generally Land Acquisition Act, 1972, LAws OF ZAMBIA, ch. 296.
164. Id. §§ 10-14.
165. Mines and Minerals Act, supra note 2, § 89.
166. Id. §§ 88(l)-(2).
167. Id. § 91(a).
168. Id. § 91(b).
169. Id. § 91(c).
170. Section 90 states that the Minister "may" notify the holder of a breach, not
"must." Id. § 90.
171. Id. §§ 124, 125(1)(a). Appeals against the state's decision to terminate mining





This Article has examined whether the Zambian Mines and Min-
eral Act of 1976 establishes a legal regime which encourages the
orderly exploitation and development of minerals and yet secures gov-
ernmental revenue. To meet these objectives, the statute must ensure
that mining rights are acquired by competent persons, that there is
free access to mineral deposits, and that mining areas are not hoarded
by speculators unwilling to develop the minerals.
To a large extent, the Act succeeds both in removing the anoma-
lies of the previous legal regime and in strengthening the state's capa-
bilities to prevent recurrence of those anomalies. The Act places the
state in control of mining operations at every stage. For example, the
state may remove any tract of land from mineral exploration at any
time; it may change terms of exploration and other mining rights; it
may change operating requirements; and it may ultimately terminate
mining rights in circumstances where mining operations are not per-
formed in the interests of the country.
The Mines Act, however, grants the miner substantial rights.
The miner may prospect areas of sufficient size to select those sections
with greatest potential. If the mineral potential warrants further
exploration, the mining right holder can obtain the exclusive legal
rights to occupy the land and to explore. Should the holder discover
minerals, he may obtain the exclusive right to develop, produce, and
sell the minerals.
The Act grants mining rights under restrictions calculated to reg-
ulate the speed and the methods of mineral extraction. Some of these
general restrictions may be used to tailor industrial development
requirements to meet the needs of the country.
The state derives its greatest benefit from the Mines Act through
its discretionary power to grant or withhold prospecting rights. The
state has thus been able to exercise judicious control over the selection
of miners. The state thereby ensures that mining rights are not
bestowed upon irresponsible persons or people without the means to
initiate and carry out mining development. The state has also elimi-
nated the constant increased capitalization of mining rights, which
had resulted from the constant sale of mining properties, through
retaining power to transfer mining rights.
Yet the Act also imposes some costs. The statute eliminates the
opportunity for an individual to obtain mining rights. The expendi-
ture obligations, for example, almost always prove prohibitive for an
individual entrepreneur. However, it may be the case that whatever
system of mining rights the state adopts, the costs of mining will
exceed the financial capacities of individuals. Invariably, the future
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would-be miner will be required to extract minerals in situations
involving heavy overburden or rock capping. With respect to techni-
cal competence and financial ability, the ordinary individual will be
unable to shoulder this burden.
The services of small miners, however, would still be useful to
extract the small mineral deposits remaining in Zambia (e.g., tin in the
Southern Province). Normally, a big company will not look at such
deposits due to excessive overhead expenses. Small miners have sug-
gested, therefore, that they have their own legislation. Although it is
preferable to treat all miners equally, there may be a need for legisla-
tion dealing specifically with small mining. The state could also create
a machinery and skilled labor pool from which such prospectors and
miners could hire machinery and skilled manpower. It is in the inter-
est of the nation that even small mineral deposits be worked properly
if resources are not to be misused and thus wasted.
The Mines Act also minimizes the possibility of mineral-land
monopolies through its expenditure obligations, fixed tenure of mining
rights, and requirement of operation programs. The Act thereby elim-
inates the holding of mineral land for speculative purposes.
On the whole, the Mines Act is sound. However, its future suc-
cess will depend upon the state's willingness to adopt future legislation
to address changing circumstances in the mining industry. The Act
must ensure the best climate for investment and rigorous entrepre-
neurship to promote increased production and mineral discovery.
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